M-111: Integer Overflow in External Data Representation (XDR) Library
Privacy and Legal Notice
INFORMATION BULLETIN
M-111: Integer Overflow in External Data Representation (XDR) Library
[CERT Advisory CA-2002-25]
August 13, 2002 21:00 GMT
[REVISED 12 Jan 2004]
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| PROBLEM: |
There is an integer overflow present in the xdr_array() function distributed as part of the Sun Microsystems XDR library. This overflow has been shown to lead to remotely exploitable buffer overflows in multiple applications, leading to the execution of arbitrary code.
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| PLATFORM: |
Systems using vulnerable implementations of SunRPC-derived XDR libraries, which include, but are not limited to:
- Sun Microsystems network services library (libnsl)
- BSD-derived libraries with XDR/RPC routines (libc)
- GNU C library with sunrpc (glibc)
- HP-UX B.10.20, B.10.26, B.11.00. B.11.11, B.11.22
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| DAMAGE: |
SunRPC-derived XDR libraries are used by a variety of vendors in a variety of applications, therefore this defect may lead to a number of differing security problems. Exploiting this vulnerability will lead to denial of service, execution of arbitrary code, or the disclosure of sensitive information.
In addition, intruders who exploit the XDR overflow in MIT KRB5 kadmind may be
able to gain control of a Key Distribution Center (KDC) and improperly authenticate to other services within a trusted Kerberos realm.
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| SOLUTION: |
Apply patches from your vendor.
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VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT: |
The risk is HIGH. Specific impacts reported include the ability to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.
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REVISION HISTORY:
1/12/04 - Added a link to Hewlett-Packard's HPSBUX0209-215 SSRT2336 (rev. 5) to
reflect HP now has patches for B.10.20, B.10.26, B.11.00, B.11.11, B.11.22.
[***** Start CERT Advisory CA-2002-25 *****]
CERT Advisory CA-2002-25 Integer Overflow In XDR Library
Original release date: August 05, 2002
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
Systems Affected
Applications using vulnerable implementations of SunRPC-derived XDR
libraries, which include, but are not limited to:
- Sun Microsystems network services library (libnsl)
- BSD-derived libraries with XDR/RPC routines (libc)
- GNU C library with sunrpc (glibc)
Overview
There is an integer overflow present in the xdr_array() function
distributed as part of the Sun Microsystems XDR library. This overflow
has been shown to lead to remotely exploitable buffer overflows in
multiple applications, leading to the execution of arbitrary code.
Although the library was originally distributed by Sun Microsystems,
multiple vendors have included the vulnerable code in their own
implementations.
I. Description
The XDR (external data representation) libraries are used to provide
platform-independent methods for sending data from one system process
to another, typically over a network connection. Such routines are
commonly used in remote procedure call (RPC) implementations to
provide transparency to application programmers who need to use common
interfaces to interact with many different types of systems. The
xdr_array() function in the XDR library provided by Sun Microsystems
contains an integer overflow that can lead to improperly sized dynamic
memory allocation. Subsequent problems like buffer overflows may
result, depending on how and where the vulnerable xdr_array() function
is used.
This issue is currently being tracked as VU#192995 by the CERT/CC and
CAN-2002-0391 in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
dictionary.
II. Impact
Because SunRPC-derived XDR libraries are used by a variety of vendors
in a variety of applications, this defect may lead to a number of
differing security problems. Exploiting this vulnerability will lead
to denial of service, execution of arbitrary code, or the disclosure
of sensitive information.
Specific impacts reported include the ability to execute arbitrary
code with root privileges (by exploiting dmispd, rpc.cmsd, or kadmind,
for example). In addition, intruders who exploit the XDR overflow in
MIT KRB5 kadmind may be able to gain control of a Key Distribution
Center (KDC) and improperly authenticate to other services within a
trusted Kerberos realm.
III. Solution
Apply a patch from your vendor
Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.
As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will update this
section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular
vendor is not listed below or in the vulnerability note, we have not
received their comments. Please contact your vendor directly.
Note that XDR libraries can be used by multiple applications on most
systems. It may be necessary to upgrade or apply multiple patches and
then recompile statically linked applications.
Applications that are statically linked must be recompiled using
patched libraries. Applications that are dynamically linked do not
need to be recompiled; however, running services need to be restarted
in order to use the patched libraries.
System administrators should consider the following process when
addressing this issue:
1. Patch or obtain updated XDR/RPC libraries.
2. Restart any dynamically linked services that make use of the
XDR/RPC libraries.
3. Recompile any statically linked applications using the patched or
updated XDR/RPC libraries.
Disable access to vulnerable services or applications
Until patches are available and can be applied, you may wish to
disable access to services or applications compiled with the
vulnerable xdr_array() function. Such applications include, but are
not limited to, the following:
- DMI Service Provider daemon (dmispd)
- CDE Calendar Manager Service daemon (rpc.cmsd)
- MIT Kerberos 5 Administration daemon (kadmind)
As a best practice, the CERT/CC recommends disabling all services that
are not explicitly required.
[***** End CERT Advisory CA-2002-25 *****]
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of CERT Coordination Center for the
information contained in this bulletin.
DOE-CIRC can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 866-941-2472 (7 x 24)
E-mail: doecirc@doecirc.energy.gov
World Wide Web: http://www.doecirc.energy.gov/